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 In a standard analysis, the history of civil liberties is characterized by a series of 
security panics.1  A range of social mechanisms—cognitive heuristics and biases, various 
forms of cascading and herding, conformity and preference falsification, and so on—
cause periodic panics in which aroused publics demand repressive measures to curtail the 
civil liberties of perceived enemies of the nation, particularly noncitizens or other 
outsiders. Government officials may themselves panic, or will at least supply the panicky 
measures that constituents demand. The standard remedy is to urge changes to legal 
doctrine or institutions, in order to curtail government’s power to repress civil liberties in 
response to security panics. 
The standard model of security panics has been criticized on several grounds.2 
Sometimes security panics are justified, even if produced by disreputable mechanisms; 
fear can motivate beneficial action as well as detrimental action. In any event, legal 
doctrines, and perhaps even institutional design, will prove incapable of constraining a 
genuinely panicked public. 
                                                 
*Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Ronald Collins, David 
Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments, to Eric Posner and Geof Stone for many enlightening 
conversations on civil liberties and related topics, and to Justin Rubin for excellent research assistance. This 
paper is forthcoming in a symposium volume of the Rutgers Law Journal. 
1I take this to be a central theme of Geof Stone’s magisterial book. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS 
TIMES : FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
Other treatments include Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Liberty, 71 SOCIAL RESEARCH 
(forthcoming)(manuscript on file with author); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in 
the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
2See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003).  
In what follows I will sketch a different criticism of the standard model. Even if 
that model is right as far as it goes, it is fatally incomplete. My central claim is that the 
mechanisms underlying security panics have no necessary or inherent pro-security 
valence. The very same mechanisms are equally capable of producing libertarian panics: 
episodes in which aroused publics become irrationally convinced that justified security 
measures represent unjustified attempts to curtail civil liberties. I will suggest that 
libertarian panics have been a regular occurrence in American history, and that we may 
be living through one now, in the form of a widespread and thoroughly irrational, even 
hysterical, reaction to small legal changes adopted after 9/11. Indeed, the tendency to 
diagnose the existence of a security panic can itself be symptomatic of a libertarian panic. 
The existence of libertarian panics undermines the institutional reforms urged by 
the advocates of the standard model. The very reforms that would minimize the risks and 
harms of security panics will maximize the risks and harms of libertarian panics. The 
institutional-design problem, then, is to optimize in light of these offsetting risks; 
whatever legal and institutional arrangements turn out to be optimal, they will necessarily 
prove less protective of civil liberties than the arrangements favored by advocates of the 
standard model. 
 Part I shows that the mechanisms that produce security panics are equally capable 
of producing libertarian panics. Part II examines libertarian panics during the Founding 
era and after 9/11, to show that libertarian panics are not only conceptually possible but 
actually occur. Part III discusses the significance of security panics and libertarian panics 
for the design of legal doctrine and institutions. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I. The Mechanisms of Panic    
 A security panic produces excessive governmental intrusion on liberty, where 
“excessive” is defined by some background normative theory of the optimal balance 
between liberty and security. The focus here is not on the background theory—not on the 
question what is to count as excessive intrusion—but instead on the irrationality of the 
process that produces the government’s actions. In the standard model, security panics 
can be produced by a range of cognitive and social mechanisms. (One might sort the 
mechanisms into different categories, although the upshot would be the same). I will 
briefly consider each type, with a view to showing that these mechanisms are inherently 
neutral with respect to the tradeoff between security and liberty. Panicked crowds may 
run in any direction, towards excessive security or excessive liberty; proponents of the 
standard model have overlooked that the mechanisms they cite are too coarse-grained to 
produce security panics alone. I conclude with brief remarks on a political mechanism 
said to produce excessive government intrusion on liberties: the possibility that 
democratic majorities will externalize the costs of security onto political minorities or 
outsiders. This is not a mechanism of panic, strictly speaking, but a similar point obtains: 
democratic majorities, whether or not in the grip of a libertarian panic, may also ignore 
the interests of minorities by externalizing the costs of liberty, exposing minorities to 
excessive security risks where majorities will not bear the costs. So the mechanism of 
political cost-externalization has no inherent anti-libertarian valence either. 
A. Cognitive Mechanisms 
A range of cognitive mechanisms have been invoked to explain security panics. 
These are, typically, heuristics: rules of thumb that boundedly rational individuals use to 
navigate settings in which information is limited, or in which a full assessment of all 
relevant information would outstrip their limited computational capacities.3 Consider the 
availability heuristic, under which “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will 
appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less 
retrievable,” and probability neglect, under which judgments of risk are insensitive to 
variations in probability.4 
Standardly, these and similar mechanisms are said to produce excessive fear of 
terrorism and other security risks. Yet it should be immediately obvious that nothing 
inherent in these mechanisms speaks at all to the content of the risk whose availability 
inflates judgments of frequency, or whose probability is neglected. Consider the risk that 
government will impose excessive security measures (defining “excessive” according to 
some background normative theory of the optimal balance between liberty and security). 
                                                 
3See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1041-50 (2003). 
4Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, IN 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (1982).  
Suppose that people neglect the probability of this risk, treating it as virtually certain, or 
as much higher than it actually is. Or suppose that a few highly available or salient 
episodes of unjustified governmental intrusion on civil liberties are easily recalled, 
causing individuals to form exaggerated estimates of the risk of intrusion. Then 
availability and probability neglect would push individuals towards a libertarian panic 
rather than towards a security panic. 
B. Social Mechanisms 
Security panics are sometimes said to be rooted in social mechanisms as well as 
individual-level mechanisms. Social cascades may occur, such that a large number of 
individuals influence each other to hold exaggerated perceptions of security risks.5 Such 
cascades need not be the product of “panic” in any pejorative sense. Consider rational 
herding mechanisms, in which the early actions of a succession of individuals, each 
possessed of some private information, influence later individuals in the chain; even if all 
are rational, the whole chain may act erroneously if the first movers’ information was 
erroneous.6 Yet there are also irrational or quasi-rational mechanisms, such as 
“availability cascades” that spread highly salient, albeit misleading, anecdotes through 
social networks, producing biased and exaggerated perceptions of risk.7 Within 
decisionmaking groups, mechanisms such as group polarization may skew risk 
perceptions even farther; highly salient or available fears will be amplified by group 
discussion.8 
In all these cases, however, the problem is that the social mechanisms of panic 
may produce libertarian panics as easily as security panics. Highly salient or available 
examples of governmental intrusions on liberty may circulate in popular discourse, 
exaggerating perceptions of the risk of governmental oppression. If government commits 
some rate of error (at least from the standpoint of hindsight) in detaining individuals as a 
risk to national security, or in detaining material witnesses, vivid tales of individual 
                                                 
5See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 
(2000)(discussing the effect of social influences on individual decision making)[hereinafter Sunstein, 
Deliberative Trouble?].  
6Id. at 84. 
7See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 
(1999). 
8Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 5. 
injustice will appear in the media. Within groups, an initial libertarian skew may be 
exaggerated by the prevalence of such anecdotes, polarizing the group even farther in a 
libertarian direction. Of course these points are conceptual, not empirical; below I will 
offer some examples of libertarian panic, especially in America after 9/11. The point here 
is just that the social mechanisms of panic cut in no particular direction. In the abstract, it 
is impossible to claim that social mechanisms are systematically more likely to produce 
security panics than libertarian panics.  
C. Does Panic Have a Valence? 
We may generalize the last point by asking whether panic systematically tends to 
push individuals in any particular direction. On the analysis here, the answer is 
emphatically no; panic has no intrinsic valence. Panicked individuals, and crowds, can 
stampede in any direction, towards excessive liberty as well as excessive security. The 
standard diagnosis of security panics is not wrong (bracketing criticisms I do not explore 
here), but it is incomplete. The mechanisms of panic produce panics, not necessarily or 
merely security panics; another possible consequence is a libertarian panic. 
There are two ways of expressing this point. Government intrusion on the proper 
scope of civil liberties—defining the proper scope of civil liberties according to some 
normative account—is a risk like any other. Any mechanism that causes people to 
misevaluate risk, or to express mistaken judgments about risk, applies to the risk of 
governmental oppression as much (or little) as it applies to any other risk. In the abstract, 
a panicked judgment that government is highly prone to abrogate civil liberties is just as 
likely as a panicked judgment that civil liberties must be abrogated for security reasons. 
Perhaps it is odd to see the chance of bad government policy as a risk, although 
that approach is now standard in many areas of legal and economic theory.9 But the point 
can be put another way, operationally equivalent to the first. People’s reactions to 
security policy are plausibly a composite or function of two variables—their perception 
of security risks and their trust in government as an agent to prevent those risks.10 The 
security panics analysis says that the mechanisms of panic can exaggerate the perception 
                                                 
9Cf. Louis Kaplow, Legal Transitions: Is there an Ideal Way to Deal with the Non-Ideal World of Legal 
Change? 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (2003). 
10With regard to trust in government, see RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS ch. 7 (2002) 
of risk too much (as measured by some background theory). But the mechanisms can also 
reduce trust in government too much (as measured by some background theory). Panic 
can produce a widespread and unjustified suspicion of governmental responses to 
genuine security risks. 
The same point holds when the analysis of security panics is put in terms of fear 
and risk aversion. Sometimes security panics are ascribed to a human tendency to 
minimize false negatives, or the failure to react to a risk, rather than false positives, 
reaction or overreaction to a nonexistent or exaggerated risk.11 This skew in risk-related 
decisionmaking, said to represent a holdover response to evolutionary conditions, may be 
rational if the harms of the false negative are systematically greater than the harms of the 
false positive. If a shadow under the trees might be a tiger, the expected costs of running 
away from a nonexistent tiger are far less than the expected costs of failing to run away 
from a real tiger. 
Whether or not this skew is rational, however, the point of interest here is that risk 
aversion gives no reason to think that security panics are more probable or more costly 
than libertarian panics. What counts as “the tiger” is not given by the risk-aversion 
argument itself. If the relevant risk is that government will unjustifiably curtail civil 
liberties, the argument from risk aversion suggests that behavior will be skewed towards 
minimizing the failure to prevent governmental overreaching; the result will be excessive 
distrust of government. 
Overall, then, the mechanisms of panic have no systematic relationship to the 
tradeoff between security and liberty. The standard analysis observes that the 
mechanisms of panic may cause society to purchase too much security and too little 
liberty, but the opposite is also possible and equally likely, at least in the abstract. A 
corollary is that a given society at a given time can undergo both security panics and 
libertarian panics. The former will increase the perception of risk, while the latter will 
reduce trust in government to prevent those risks; the net result is unclear, and it will be a 
sheer fortuity if the two effects cancel each other out. Although it is possible in principle 
that the very same institutions or social groups might undergo a security panic and a 
                                                 
11See STONE, supra note 1, at 530. 
libertarian panic simultaneously, it is more likely that both types of panics occur at the 
same time but among different institutional or social sectors. Pointing to the existence of 
a security panic in one sector is not even prima facie inconsistent with the possibility of a 
libertarian panic in other sectors. If legislators are in the grip of a security panic, judges 
may be in the grip of a libertarian panic, or vice-versa. We will return to these 
institutional implications below. 
D. A Note on Democratic Cost-Externalization, and Other Political Distortions 
The literature on security panics often runs together the diagnosis of panic with a 
different idea: that democratic majorities will sacrifice the civil liberties of outsider 
groups—foreigners, resident noncitizens, illegal immigrants, and so on—in the interest of 
maximizing the majority’s security. This idea strictly speaking has nothing to do with 
panic. On the picture sketched by these accounts, a rational, albeit self-interested, 
democratic majority would sacrifice the civil liberties of outsider groups just because the 
majority captures the security gains while shunting the costs of its illiberal policies onto 
others. The basic idea is not one of panic, but of rational cost-externalization. 
Nonetheless, the claim here parallels the standard claim about security panics: in both 
cases, a decisionmaking distortion causes the democratic majority to purchase too much 
security and not enough liberty, from the social point of view. 
And the problems with the two claims are also parallel. As with security panics, 
the mechanism of democratic cost-externalization is pitched at too high a level of 
abstraction to produce the conclusion that civil libertarians want to reach. If the structure 
of the political system allows democratic majorities to externalize costs onto minorities 
and outsiders, they may externalize any sort of cost, not merely the costs of purchasing 
security. 
In particular, it is quite possible that democratic majorities will externalize the 
costs of liberty onto minority and outsider groups, purchasing too little security because 
majorities do not bear the costs of insecurity. This is a familiar point in debates over 
criminal-justice policy, where affluent libertarians are charged with supporting 
constitutional rights that protect the criminals who prey upon poor minority communities. 
The affluent libertarians do not bear anything like the full costs of crime, and thus support 
a more expansive scheme of civil liberties than would be produced if poor minority 
communities had proportionate influence in the political system. 
The same mechanism might operate in the terrorism context. Consider the 
possibility that libertarian majorities, mostly living outside of the large urban areas that 
are the best target for terrorism, will cause the political system to invest too little in 
terrorism prevention because they do not bear the full costs of its occurrence. On this 
account, the red-state voters who supported the Republican party in 2000 and 2004 might 
cause the national political process to provide too much liberty and inadequate security 
for blue-state urban centers.12 Whether or not this story is true, the point is that there is no 
general reason to think that cost-externalization systematically tilts in the direction of 
producing too much security, rather than too much liberty. Whatever the optimal balance 
at a given time, and whatever political forces produce the actual balance at a given time, 
the appeal to democratic cost-externalization is too general to get much traction on the 
issues. 
The same is true of other libertarian claims that political “distortions” can cause 
government to produce too much security and not enough liberty. Here, of course, the 
libertarian background theory must specify both an optimal liberty-security tradeoff and 
an account of undistorted political process. I bracket the content of that background 
theory, however, in favor of a different point. Even if such a theory exists, whatever 
political distortions it identifies can also operate in exactly the same manner to produce 
excessive liberty and inadequate security. 
Consider the suggestion that security panics are produced by self-interested 
security entrepreneurs: government officials and interest groups who whip up security 
panics for political advantage. The implicit model here is underspecified: are voters and 
citizens rationally ignorant, or just irrational? If the latter, why are their agents rational 
(albeit self-interested)? In any event, why does not institutional competition cause, say, 
                                                 
12Dean E. Murphy, Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States, NY TIMES A1 (October 12, 2004); 
Keven Diaz, Pork-barrel security; Federal money to protect Americans from terrorism may not be going to 
states that need it the most. Formulas and politics are behind the disparities, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-
St. Paul) 1A, (September 11, 2004); Elizabeth Shogren, More Federal Aid Sought for Cities at Risk of 
Attack; Under the current rules, a large chunk of such funds goes to less vulnerable areas. Efforts to 
redirect money have stalled in Congress, L.A. TIMES A21, (August 10, 2004). 
competing candidates for office, or other branches of government, to attempt to dampen 
the panic? Finally, what are the microfoundations of the account—how exactly does 
expanding the power of the governmental security apparatus personally benefit self-
seeking officials and groups?13 
Even bracketing such points, however, the problem is that the opposite political 
distortion is equally possible, at least in the abstract. Officials, candidates for office, and 
interest groups may act as self-interested libertarian entrepreneurs. Such entrepreneurs—
we might think of the ACLU and Michael Moore most recently—may whip up a 
libertarian scare, exaggerating reports of governmental intrusion in order to establish a 
public climate that is hostile to governmental power, to oust a disfavored incumbent, or to 
increase membership and donations. Here again, political failure in the sense of panic-
ridden and nondeliberative public discourse turns out to have no general authoritarian (as 
opposed to libertarian) valence. 
II. Libertarian Panics in America 
 Nothing in the mechanisms of panic suggests any systematic tilt towards security 
panics, as opposed to libertarian panics. But do libertarian panics actually occur? I 
believe that they do; not only can it happen here, it has. I cannot offer a full historical 
treatment, for lack of both space and expertise. Instead I will very briefly consider both 
the founding era and the period after 9/11, merely to generate plausible hypotheses for 
further research. 
A. Colonial America 
Bernard Bailyn describes the atmosphere of public opinion in Colonial America after 
1763 in the following terms: 
[The colonists] saw about them, with increasing clarity, not merely mistaken, or even 
evil, policies violating the principles upon which freedom rested, but what appeared 
to be evidence of nothing less than a deliberate assault launched surreptitiously by 
plotters against liberty both in England and in America. . . . This belief transformed 
the meaning of the colonists’ struggle, and it added an inner accelerator to the 
movement of opposition. For, once assumed, it could not be easily dispelled: denial 
only confirmed it, since what conspirators profess is not what they believe; the 
ostensible is not the real; and the real is deliberately malign. 
                                                 
13See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 
(2005). 
 It was this—the overwhelming evidence, as they saw it, that they were faced with 
conspirators against liberty determined at all costs to gain ends which their words 
dissembled—that was signaled to the colonists after 1763, and it was this above all 
else that in the end propelled them into Revolution.14 
Bailyn emphasizes that this widespread, and wildly overheated, suspicion and mistrust of 
the British colonial administration “rose in the consciousness of a large segment of the 
American population before any of the famous political events of the struggle with 
England took place.” The 1763 Stamp Act was “a danger signal”: 
For though it could be argued, and in a sense proved by the swift repeal of the act, 
that nothing more was involved than ignorance or confusion on the part of people in 
power who really knew better and who, once warned by the reaction of the colonists, 
would not repeat the mistake—though this could be, and by many was, concluded, 
there nevertheless appeared to be good reason to suspect that more was involved.15 
 If Bailyn is right, then the very Revolution itself16 might be described as the 
consequence of a widespread and sustained libertarian panic, or perhaps a wave of serial 
panics. Bailyn does little to identify the mechanisms that produced the founding-era 
libertarian panics; of course that is not his chief concern. It takes little imagination, 
however, to see the mechanisms of panic at work. A social-scientific version of Bailyn’s 
treatment might suggest that the colonists focused obsessively on highly salient or 
available episodes of government oppression, whether or not those episodes were 
representative of British policy; neglected the probabilities of an antilibertarian 
conspiracy, focusing solely on what consequences it would have if it did materialize; and 
polarized, through group discussion and other social mechanisms, towards an extremist 
libertarian viewpoint. 
B. The Patriot Act Panic  
Let us provide a bookend to the founding era by examining the reaction, particularly 
among intellectuals and other segments of the elite public, to statutes and administrative 
policies created after 9/11 to reduce terrorism risks. The subject is heterogeneous; for 
convenience, I will focus on the most salient component of terrorism policy, the USA 
                                                 
14BERNARD BAILYN, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95 (1992). 
15Id. at 99 
16Not, however, the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, which were framed several decades after the 
events Bailyn describes. 
Patriot Act of 2001.17 Many civil libertarians denounce the Patriot Act in apocalyptic 
terms. Since 9/11, some 360 local communities, and 4 States, have passed ordinances 
calling the Act a fundamental retrenchment of American civil liberties.18 Much popular 
and academic commentary takes an equally lurid line.19 
Many of these claims can only be described as ignorant; many are also irrational, 
even hysterical. The most common mistake is a sort of baseline error. Civil libertarians 
ascribe to the Patriot Act “deprivations” of civil liberties as measured from some baseline 
set of entitlements that either never existed, or that was changed in the relevant respects 
long before the Patriot Act was passed. 
Here are some examples of baseline error. First, consider one of the Act’s most 
controversial provisions, the so-called “sneak and peek” provision (Section 213). The 
provision allows for the required notice to the target of a search warrant to be delayed for 
a reasonable period, if a court finds reasonable cause for doing so. Local ordinances and 
public statements by libertarian advocacy groups have denounced the provision in lurid 
terms, as a fundamental curtailment of civil liberties;20 the ACLU claimed that it marks a 
“sea change in the way search warrants are executed in the United States.”21 The problem 
                                                 
17For the point that the Patriot Act’s very name may have helped to spark libertarian panic, see Eric A. 
Posner & John Yoo, The Patriot Act Under Fire, The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2003 at A26.   
18See List of Communities that have Passed Resolutions at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11294&c=207 (last visited on 1/2/05).  
19See, e.g., Elaine Scarry, Acts of Resistance, Harper’s Magazine, May 2004, at p. 15; William E. Zieske, 
Demystifying the USA Patriot Act, 92 ILL. B.J. 82 (2004); Jeremy C. Smith, The USA Patriot Act: Violating 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National 
Security, 82 N.C.L. REV 412 (2003); Patria Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security 
with Privacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U.L. REV. 375 (2002); Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking 
Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 922 (2002). 
20 ee, e.g., Vermont Legislature Resolution, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12734&c=207; Community Resolution for Lowell, 
MA, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17189&c=207; Community 
Resolution for Kansas City/Wyandotte County, KS, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17190&c=206; Community Resolution for 
Westchester, NY, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=16526&c=207; 
Richmond, VA, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15549&c=207; 
Community Resolution for Homer, AK, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13243&c=206; See also, the ACLU Draft 
Resolution, which many of the resolutions copy in some form or another, “Model Local Resolution to 
Protect Civil Liberties available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11267&c=207(saying, the Patriot Act “expand[s] 
the authority of federal agents to conduct so-called “sneak and peek” or “black bag” searches. . .).  
21How the USA-Patriot Act Expands Law Enforcement "Sneak and Peek" Warrants available at 
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=9769&c=39 
is that the provision merely codifies preexisting settled law. As of 1979, the Supreme 
Court had already described the argument that notice could not be delayed as 
“frivolous.”22 
Second, consider Section 215 of the Act, which allows courts to issue subpoenas for 
business records in national security investigations. Many have denounced the provision 
as a mechanism of governmental oppression. Yet the provision codifies a power that 
grand juries (typically dominated by prosecutors) have long exercised without judicial 
oversight. Measured from that baseline, as opposed to some imaginary libertarian one, 
the addition of judicial subpoenas looks no worse and possibly better, from the point of 
view of targets and defendants. 
The most critical example of baseline error, however, involves the complaint that the 
Patriot Act authorizes Orwellian electronic surveillance of persons who pose a threat to 
national security.23 The problem is that 
[T]he Act did not initiate this practice. The system of secret search and wiretap 
warrants, granted in a secret hearing by a group of federal judges, without notice to 
the target, was established 25 years ago by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
[of 1978]. FISA was passed because before 1978 authorities could conduct searches 
to stop threats to national security without any judicial warrants at all.24 
So there is actually a double or nested baseline error in the hysteria about the Patriot 
Act’s surveillance provisions. The Act’s only significant contribution to the law in this 
area is Section 218, which eliminated administrative and judicial interpretations of the 
FISA that had created a “wall” of separation between the information held by counter-
intelligence officials and that held by law-enforcement officials. But most of the FISA 
was in place long before the Patriot Act; and the FISA itself represents a libertarian, 
rights-protective regime, relative to the pre-1978 legal baseline. 
                                                 
22Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1979) 
23The loudest of the groups making such claims include the ACLU, see 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12263&c=206; and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, see http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/PATRIOT/; city and state resolutions 
have also criticized the surveillance power authorized under the Patriot Act as an invasion of rights, see e.g. 
Minneapolis’s resolution, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12291&c=207; the Alaska State Legislature’s 
Resolution, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12707&c=207; and the 
State of Maine Resolution, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15294&c=207.  
24Posner & Yoo, supra note 7.  
Overall, the, the reaction to the Patriot Act among journalists, public commentators, 
and academics is grossly out of proportion to its real effect. The next question is why 
such a systematic error of public perception has occurred. Future sociological work might 
trace and specify the mechanisms that have created this libertarian panic. In addition to 
individual-level cognitive failures such as baseline error, it seems plausible to 
hypothesize that social mechanisms have been in play, including various forms of 
polarization, herding and cascades among the state governments, legal elites and 
libertarian intellectuals who have condemned the Patriot Act in strong terms.25 
Finally, let us be clear that the Patriot Act panic, like the colonial panic, has been 
highly consequential. The consequence of the modern panic may well be that the Patriot 
Act will not be renewed. If so, future adjustments of the balance between security and 
liberty will be constrained by widespread but panicky popular opinion that condemns 
policy innovation by reference to imaginary, and highly libertarian, legal baselines. 
C. How Frequent Are Libertarian Panics? 
I have not attempted to show either that libertarian panics are frequent in American 
history, or that they are as frequent as security panics. A full historical investigation, 
equal in scope and detail to Geof Stone’s indispensable history of security panics,26 
would be needed to document either of those claims. What I have attempted to show is 
that that libertarian panics (1) are conceptually possible and (2) have occurred at 
important moments of our history. 
It remains possible that security panics occur more frequently, and more intensely, 
than libertarian panics; the issue is empirical, and cannot be resolved through a priori 
reasoning. People panic easily at the thought that terrorists are trying to kill them, but 
they also panic easily at the thought that jack-booted government thugs are coming for 
them. It bears emphasis, moreover, that no conclusions about optimal institutional design 
are possible without estimating the relative frequency and gravity of both security panics 
                                                 
25David Strauss has pointed out to me that the Patriot Act panic may not really be about the statute, 
despite the public claims of the statute’s critics; the panic might rest instead on systematic distrust of the 
Bush administration officials who are charged with enforcing the statute’s provisions. Of course, that 
distrust itself might in turn be the product of various panic-inducing mechanisms, especially various forms 
of groupthink among libertarian-leaning elites. 
26See STONE, supra note 1 (passim).  
and libertarian panics (a point I pursue in Part III below). The standard model cannot be 
justified simply by documenting a long history of security panics. Unless and until an 
equally thorough history of libertarian panics is done, we just do not know the relative 
expected magnitude of the two effects, and the institutional-design assumptions of the 
standard model are unjustified. 
III. Libertarian Panics, Law, and Institutions 
 Suppose there are libertarian panics. What follows? In the standard model, the 
risk of security panics is said to justify legal doctrines or institutional arrangements that 
place a drag on liberty-restricting governmental action. These rules act as second-best 
constraints that limit the frequency and gravity of unjustified restrictions on liberty. If 
there are libertarian panics, however, then the legal and institutional calculus is more 
complicated. In addition to unjustified restrictions on liberty, we must be concerned about 
inadequate restrictions on liberty. The very legal rules and institutional arrangements that 
minimize the first type of error will exacerbate the second type of error. The net result 
depends on facts, about the relative risks and magnitudes of the two types of error, and 
we can say little about this in the abstract. It seems clear, however, that optimal legal 
rules and institutional arrangements will certainly be less libertarian than they would be if 
security panics were the only type of panic in the picture. 
A. Second-best Libertarianism 
To understand the institutional implications of the standard model, we need to define 
a cost-benefit baseline for security policy. On this picture, security and liberty are both 
valuable goods that trade off against one another in predictable ways. To be sure, security 
and liberty are complements as well as substitutes; liberty cannot be enjoyed without 
security, and security is not worth enjoying without liberty. And there is something like a 
Pareto frontier for liberty and security; in some situations rational policymakers can 
increase security at no cost to liberty, or increase liberty at no cost to security. But 
advanced liberal democracies, let us suppose, are typically at or near the frontier already. 
In their circumstances, an appreciable increase in security will require some decrease in 
liberty, and vice-versa. The problem from the social point of view is one of optimization: 
it is to choose the point along the frontier that maximizes the joint benefits of security and 
liberty (bracketing all of the well-known problems with aggregative social welfare 
functions). Neither security nor liberty is lexically prior; no claims of the type “liberty is 
priceless” or “security at all costs” will be admitted. 
So far all this is a common assumption of the standard model, albeit usually an 
implicit one. Let us turn to the role of security panics in the security/liberty tradeoff. In 
the most sophisticated version of the argument, decisionmakers who are subject to 
security panics ought not engage directly in balancing that attempts to strike the optimal 
tradeoff between liberty and security. Those decisionmakers will predictably skew their 
judgments in favor of security, resulting in excessively restrictive policies (“excessively” 
from the standpoint of the social welfare function that defines the optimal tradeoff). 
The institutional solution, on this view, is to deny front-line decisionmakers the 
authority to engage in direct or first-order balancing of liberty and security. The preferred 
alternative is “second-order balancing,” under which civil liberties are overprotected 
through second-best rules that mitigate the risk of error in the first-order calculus.27 
Consider the Court’s development of overprotective restrictions on government’s ability 
to punish political speech. An all things-considered first-order optimization or balancing 
approach to political speech that threatens social harms would “ask whether the gravity of 
the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”28 Doctrines holding that legislation must be content-
neutral, and that government may only punish political speech that “imminently” incites 
unlawful action,29 build in a skew that compensates for predictable decisionmaker error 
in the application of the first-order balancing test. As the example shows, the argument 
for second-order balancing goes beyond an abstract claim that rules may correct for the 
errors that decisionmakers commit under first-order balancing. In this setting, the 
argument for second-order balancing is an argument not only for rules, but for rules with 
a distinctly libertarian slant—a kind of second-best libertarianism. The idea is to build 
into the second-order rules a skew in favor of liberty that will compensate for predictable 
pressures towards overweighting security—pressures such as security panics. 
B. Two Types of Errors 
                                                 
27Sunstein, supra note 1, at 17 
28See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand). 
29See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
Given the possibility of libertarian panics, second-best libertarianism is too simplistic. 
Doctrines and institutions that compensate for the distorting effect of security panics 
(relative to the optimum that a perfect first-order balancer would identify) will exacerbate 
the distorting effect of libertarian panics. The argument for second-order libertarianism 
focuses exclusively on one type of error—excessive security induced by security 
panics—and ignores another type of error—excessive liberty induced by libertarian 
panics. 
Consider two institutional solutions for the problem of security panics.30 The first 
suggestion involves internal congressional procedures intended to create a barrier against 
panicky legislation restricting civil liberties. For example, “Congress could enact a rule 
prohibiting it from enacting wartime legislation without full and fair deliberation.”31 The 
second suggestion is for a “protocol [that] might require any wartime legislation limiting 
civil liberties to contain a ‘sunset’ provision.”32 The assumption common to such 
suggestions is that “[a]nything that slows the process, allows for greater deliberation, and 
limits the potential scope and impact of hastily enacted legislation limiting civil liberties 
is salutary.”33 
There are many possible lines of objection here. Such protocols, which are not 
entrenched in the Constitution, may themselves be overridden by panicked legislators, so 
given the diagnosis of security panics the remedy be a nonstarter.34 And the two 
suggestions are in some tension with each other, as the knowledge that a given law 
contains a sunset proviso lowers the stakes of enacting it and may thus detract from the 
very legislative deliberation that the first protocol is meant to encourage.35 
The possibility of libertarian panics supports a different objection, however. To the 
extent libertarian panics occur, then the danger is that the political system will produce 
too little legislation restricting civil liberties, rather than too much. Institutional protocols 
                                                 
30Proposed, and discussed with more nuance than I can do justice to here, by STONE, supra note 1. 
31STONE, supra note 1, at 539. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1047-51(proposing a “supermajoritarian escalator” as a way of limiting the ability of the government to use 
emergency powers).  
32STONE, supra note 1, at 540. 
33STONE, supra note 1, at 540. 
34See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 
432-33 (2004). Stone acknowledges this problem. STONE, supra note 1, at 540. 
35Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
or arrangements that further raise the cost of enacting restrictions on civil liberties will 
push the system farther away from the optimum, not (as the assumption runs) closer to it. 
Legislators forced by internal protocols to enact less liberty-restricting legislation than 
they otherwise would, will merely underprotect security all the more, from the standpoint 
of the social optimum. 
To be sure, the precise shape of the optimal institutional rules will depend upon the 
relative frequency and gravity of the two types of errors. If libertarian panics are rare and 
mild, a diluted second-order libertarianism might still be appropriate. But if libertarian 
panics are as frequent and powerful as security panics, then the optimal rules will just be 
those suggested by first-order balancing; there will be no reason to introduce a second-
order skew to compensate for errors in either direction. We can even imagine, on certain 
facts, a case for second-best authoritarianism: if libertarian panics are more frequent and 
powerful than security panics, then second-order institutional design would do well to 
build in a compensating skew that would push outcomes in the direction of less liberty 
and more security. 
Conclusion  
 The commentary on emergencies, constitutionalism and civil liberties after 9/11 is 
rife with claims that America is undergoing a security panic.36 From a different 
perspective, this widespread diagnosis of a security panic may itself just be evidence of, 
or even be the very stuff of, a libertarian panic. Bailyn’s panicky libertarian colonials saw 
the specter of authoritarianism in even the mildest policy measures of the British 
administration, but were content to ascribe the wrongdoing to nefarious motives. Current 
commentators are more sophisticated. Like the colonials, they see the small-bore legal 
changes as a massive adjustment of the balance between security and liberty, but they 
explain the lurch towards authoritarianism on more modern-seeming psychological 
grounds. On those same grounds, however, it might also be said that panicky libertarians 
                                                 
36See Chisun Lee, Civil Rights Rollback, The Spread of Racial Profiling Since 9-11, The Village Voice, 
August 3, 2004; Anthony Lewis, Bush and the Lesser Evil, The New York Review of Books, May 27, 
2004, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17111; Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military At home 
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 165 (2003); Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunals, The 
New York Review of Books, February 14, 2002 available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15122; Jules 
Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002).  
are especially likely to diagnose security panics in the surrounding society. It might turn 
out that the very people who are most prone to accuse others of panicking are the people 
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